

The CIA and the Problems of Secrecy in an Open Society

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In 1949, when I gave my first paper for the Holland Professional Club, I used as my topic an American poet who had once been my teacher. This spring, thirty-five years later, as I contemplated a topic for what may well be my last paper, I thought, "Wouldn't it be fitting to come full circle and give as my swan song another paper on American poetry - this time some American poets' picturing of old age and the process of aging. But I was inhibited by the pitch given recently by one of the young Turks of the Club, Andy Mulder, to the effect that members' topics should be on something other than their area of professional expertise. And since both the field of poetry and the topic of aging and old age are in my area of expertise, I decided to plunge into an area I knew little about, except in a very amateur and sub-literary way.

For a long time I have found relaxation and excitement in reading mystery stories and novels of suspense, intrigue and espionage. The latter, frequently by British and European authors, such as Ian Fleming, John La Carre, Graham Greene, Stanley Ellin, Bill Granger et al, tend to focus on the exploits of secret agents - the KGB, the MI6, the Mossad, and the CIA. It was a bit disconcerting to find that the picture of the American agent - the CIA - was often quite unflattering. He was often very cynical, unprincipled, ruthless - or else quite naive and even somewhat bumbling. What an unfair portrayal I thought, at first. But as I became increasingly bombarded by critiques and exposes of the CIA - from the time of the late sixties to the present - from News papers, magazines, "Sixty Minutes", Jack Anderson, The Congressional Record - their sometimes questionable role in affairs of other countries - Italy, Chile, Cuba, Guatamala, Vietnam, Nicaragua - I began to wonder, uneasily, like many Americans, especially in the aftermath of Watergate, about this shadowy secret arm of the U. S. government. Is it an essential safeguard or a prying, unscrupulous monster? Who controls the CIA or is it beyond control. Who should control it? How?

However, these were some rather idle questions that rattled around on the edge of my conscience - until, late this spring, I picked up a book with an interesting title (at least for a spy-novel buff): The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA. It was a cross between a biography

of Helms during his thirty years of service as a CIA agent - ten of them as Director - and an analysis of the organization he served. I was hooked. So I moved further into the lights and shadows of that operation: to the fascinating autobiography of another long-time secret agent, David Atlee Phillips, entitled Night Watch; then to the sensational autobiographical account and exposé of the CIA by another agent, the disillusioned Philip Agee, called Inside the Company: CIA Diary; on to the sober analysis by Roy Cline, long time Deputy Director of Intelligence of the CIA, in his Secrets, Spies and Scholars; then to Stephen Ambrose's volume, Ike's Spies, a fine account of Eisenhower's involvement with the "Espionage Establishment" as General and as President; and finally on to more general analyses of some of the problems these volumes brought up, such as one entitled Foreign Intelligence: Legal and Democratic Controls.

As I read, my idle questions became for me important questions. How essential is it to have a strong intelligence arm? What is meant when we talk about an "intelligence organization"? Is the CIA really what its name implies, simply an agency to provide information (intelligence) for the political leaders of our country about the aims and secret operations of foreign nations, especially as they touch on our national security? Or has it become something more - and perhaps almost ^{something} other - the secret tool of the Administrative branch of our government to promote or carry out its policies vis a vis other nations? If the latter, or at least in part the latter, are there any restrictions on the methods it employs? Should there be? If so, who should determine the rules? Who should be involved in the decisions for particular actions?

In a club like this, with its range of hawks and doves, its civil libertarians and its law-and-order buffs, its idealists and its pragmatists, such questions should provoke loud response. So, to prime the pump and to provide some background for such discussion, let me proceed with some historical context and with a sharpening of the issues inherent in my topic: "The CIA and the Problems of Secrecy in an Open Society."

The CIA came into existence in 1947. It was an outgrowth of our experience during World War II, when securing accurate information about our enemy's operations and plans, and employing strategies such as secret negotiations, subversion, and intrigue behind enemy lines were essential for winning the war. In 1941 President Roosevelt created the Office of Coordinator of Intelligence (COI), shortly after renamed

the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), under the direction of Colonel Bill Donovan. When Eisenhower became Supreme Commander of the European Theater, he insisted that the OSS be brought under his jurisdiction. The Army, Navy, State Department, and the White House each wanted it under its own direct aegis, but, as is usual in wartime, the military won. Up to this time, the U.S. was quite naive at the game of espionage, the "wizard war", as Churchill, an avid devotee of this phase of the conflict, liked to call it. He personally initiated Eisenhower, and the English agency, the MI6, was the chief tutor of the fledgling OSS in the beginning phase of its operation.

The most brilliant intelligence operation of the combined OSS and MI6 corps was the breaking of the supposedly unbreakable code that the Nazis had developed to transmit its secret messages to its political and military leaders. Almost as impressive as the breaking of the code itself was the maintenance of secrecy on the code-breaking, so that the Germans continued to use their code unsuspectingly all during the war. This operation, aptly code-named ULTRA, is considered by military historians one of the prime reasons for the success of the Allied landing at Normandy and for the overall Allied victory in the European field. As for subversion and intrigue activities of the OSS, they were especially helpful in organizing French resistance after the fall of France, and in winning over the French armies in the colonial areas. Sabotage, bribery, and even assassination were among the bag of tricks used.

Directly after the close of the war, President Truman took steps to dismantle the OSS. ("We don't need a Gestapo in peace time.") Agents were dismissed or turned over to the other intelligence operations, run by the Army, the Navy, the State Department, who were glad to regain more independence. But as the gulf between the U.S. and its war-time ally, Russia, widened, this move was reversed. In 1947 a plan was submitted to Congress and enacted into law: The National Security Act. Among other items the Act established a National Security Council chaired by the President, with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (a new position created by the Act to promote integration) as key members, along with the Director of the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization, and the Vice President. Permanent observers to the Council were the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the agency that the Act also authorized: the Central Intelligence Agency. At meetings of the Council other persons might be invited, for example the Attorney General, the

Secretary of the Treasury.

The overall role of the National Security Council was to advise the President on matters germane to our national defense. As for the CIA, its functions were spelled out in the Act as follows:

1. To advise the NSC in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the government departments and agencies as relate to national security.
2. To make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of such intelligence activities.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government.
4. To perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally.

Note the emphasis on coordination. Under existing conditions, there were intelligence operations run by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department, as well as the F.B.I and the Atomic Energy Commission. These could be and were competing and often overlapping. The CIA was designed to bring them all together under one roof - a civilian roof - reporting to the President. The CIA Director (DCI) was to be appointed by the President with Senate approval. Note too that the CIA could establish its own information-gathering staff when this was "efficient", but that it had access to the information of other intelligence groups so that it could perform its next task - to analyze it and to present reports, daily, to the President and all others designated by him about ^{the} operations and capacities and plans of other nations, that had national security implications.

Already in 1947, the U.S. government had begun to look upon Russia as the great threat to its national security, and as the years progressed that feeling heightened. Fundamentally, then, the CIA's chief reason for being came to be perceived as an instrument to counteract the Soviet threat. CIA neophytes, during their training period, took courses in Communism and Soviet Foreign Policy. They were taught that, since destruction of the U.S. is the dominant goal of the USSR (Peace, according to the Communist thesis, is impossible until the U.S. is defeated), countering the Soviet threat is the main mission of the CIA.

Gathering information about a country can proceed in a variety of ways. Much can be gained by listening to or reading the news media of that country, by talking with those who have visited or emigrated from that country, by discussions with experts on the affairs of that country, etc.

A significant number of employees in the CIA are engaged in these overt, non-secret tasks. However, since Russian is such a closed society, ^{it is very difficult to} securing information as to plans and capabilities of the Russians, especially plans for subversion or military action, ~~is very difficult to get~~. It requires spying, the subversion of enemy agents or enemy citizens, and the use of sophisticated equipment (bugs, spy planes, etc.). Secrecy is important for several reasons. If the enemy is aware of our knowledge of their plans, their value is reduced or negated. Secondly, such methods usually involve violating the laws of that country. For example, a spy can hardly avoid falsifying papers to gain entrance into that country. Or again, bribing nationals to obtain sensitive information is a crime in any country. In normal relations, such actions are considered "wrong". A U.S. citizen should obey the laws of the country he is visiting, just as we expect foreigners to obey our laws when they visit us. The justification for such illegal behavior ^{of} a spy, of course, is that in the ^{we} world as it is, such aberrations are necessary, as the only means of discovering what ^{are} ~~the~~ the terrible intentions of our adversaries, and thus prevent a sudden or subversive attack that threatens our national security. Spies and intelligence gathering operations that are covert and illegal are fairly well recognized in the international community as a "fact of life" - not proper but necessary. A game to be played.

Since the enemy is undoubtedly doing the same - using the same means - an intelligence agency such as the CIA or KGB must be concerned also to ferret out these activities of the opposition - a program of counter-intelligence. Especially it must be concerned that the intelligence community itself not be infiltrated. In the tasks of gathering information and nullifying the opposition's information gathering, secrecy is important. Don't let the enemy know what we have found out. Don't let them know how we found it out (protect our sources, our agents in place). And don't let them plant their own agents in our system, so that they can send back secret, critical information, or provide dis-information to us, that we accept as truth.

If we once accept the bending of the rules of normal proper behavior to allow for covert information-seeking activities, on the grounds that these are absolutely essential for making wise decisions to protect ourselves against violent or subversive attack (a reasonable right of every nation), then it is not difficult to take another step. Why not go on to other secret, illegal actions that are designed to alter the internal life of another country in a manner that will benefit us - again on the grounds that ~~in these to~~ ~~the long run at least this~~ will promote our national security.

Is it O. K. for ^{our} a government secretly to infuse money ^{into the political campaign in another country} to defeat a candidate ~~for the legislature of another country~~, on the grounds that he is anti-American or is pinkish in philosophy, or to promote a candidate to our liking? Is it O. K. to subvert a newspaper in another country so that it will give a certain slant, or even issue "disinformation" (i.e. lies) in order to upset the existing, unfriendly regime, or to promote riots or strikes, or to provide arms or train guerillas for the task of overthrowing or removing (i.e. killing) government leaders unfriendly to the U.S. or at least open to Russian help? These are all forms of covert intervention in the internal affairs of another sovereign state, forms that violate the charter of the United Nations that we were instrumental in establishing, and ^{no} which we piously continue to pronounce our allegiance. All these types of activities have been used by the CIA, secret actions, "operations" not aimed at securing intelligence on which sound ^{foreign} policy ^{and defense plans} ~~is a vis-à-vis other countries~~ might be made, but aimed at carrying out policies. Should this be a function of the CIA - or any agency of the U.S. government? It certainly was a function of the OSS, during war~~time~~ time. When the National Security Act was under discussion in 1947, there was considerable debate and disagreement as to whether this aspect of the OSS should be carried over to the permanent, peace-time intelligence agency. The result was a rather vaguely worded fifth function given to the new Agency:

5. To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to time direct.

Under this aegis, the "dirty tricks" operations of the CIA have been carried out. This phase of the work of the CIA has been the one that has most intrigued ~~most of~~ the Directors of the CIA ^{since its inception} and been the chief focus of their attention. It is this phase that has caused the most controversy.

In 1963, Allen Dulles, at the time the Director of the CIA, denounced the KGB as "a multipurpose, clandestine arm of power, more than an intelligence or counter-intelligence organization. It is an instrument of subversion, manipulation, and violence, for the secret intervention in the affairs of other countries." (Big Brother at his nefarious work, in other countries!) It is rather chilling to realize that in many countries around the world, especially in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, and South and Central America, Dulles' description of the KGB is also applied by a majority of their nationals to the CIA. Even in our own country, the general belief of the average American citizen in the 1950s that what distinguished

the behavior of our CIA from that of the awful KGB was that we did not do such things (we are good guys), gradually dissipated during the 60s and 70s under the spate of revelations of the role of the CIA in overthrowing Mossadegh and putting the Shah in power, ^{in the Bay of Pigs FIA 500} of CIA plans to assassinate Castro and Lumumba, ¹⁷² its operations to overthrow a democratically elected government in Guatamala in favor of a military dictatorship. ^{etc.} The CIA, they discovered, was involved too in tactics of subversion, manipulation, and violence for the secret intervention in the affairs of other countries. It was not, in other words, a Boy Scout operation. Richard Helms, CIA director, once said, "We are not Boy Scouts. If we had wanted to be, we would have joined the Boy Scouts."

Much earlier than the unease of the general public, some members of the U. S. Congress were upset by the early exploits of the CIA Operations segment. In 1956 Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution calling for a "Joint Congressional Oversight Committee for the American Clandestine Service." Ike opposed this strongly, and to forestall action in that direction he appointed his own committee to investigate the CIA, headed by General Jimmy Doolittle, the famous World War II aviator. The conclusion of the report of that committee established a rationale that many Americans today - including I believe Ronald Reagan - find convincing:

It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U.S. is to survive, long-standing American concepts of fair play must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter-espionage services, must learn to subvert, sabotage, and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

We enter here the thicket of determining what are justifiable actions - of our government and its CIA - the arena of situational ethics. Let's examine the Doolittle Committee conclusion and its rationale. It assumes a world that has been reduced to a jungle, and the goal of humans - especially Americans - reduced to stark survival. The enemy is implacable; it resorts to any means; its goal is conquest. The people of the U.S. are engaged in a death struggle with the people of Russia. It is kill or be killed; freedom or slavery. This is war, and in war time, no holds are barred. To talk about periods of peace is to talk nonsense. Even efforts to distinguish cold war from hot war make no sense. The old distinctions that were made to justify the shrinking of normal human rights - namely that in periods of

extreme emergency (war) they must temporarily be suspended - no longer apply. We are in a constant state of emergency (war). To cope with the enemy, we must trust the commander-in-chief, give him emergency powers, refrain from exercising our normal rights when he says these are fraught with danger to the national security, and thus to our own survival. We must support and even perform acts which are normally repugnant.

The humane spirit in man, cries out against such a bleak picture, (reaching for a goal more worthwhile than mere physical survival.) And the human reason asks, is the condition of the world really this terrible? If it is at this moment, is there no way of rising above the jungle? Are there no steps that can be taken to establish a more peaceful, more humane world?

Without question, the driving force behind such a view, for most Americans, and I believe for most Russians is fear - fear that the opposing government and its people are bent implacably on the national destruction of the other, involving their individual destruction or slavery. So the opposing government and its people tend to become Satan - the incarnation of evil, with whom there can be no compromise. In such a scenario, detente or coexistence is a mirage. Reconciliation or conversion is a laughable delusion. Now actually, few Americans follow this scenario to the extreme. Few Americans really consider all or even perhaps most Russians as implacably evil, plotting and scheming the overthrow of the U.S. The same can, I feel certain, be said about Russians' views of the American populace. Even government spokesmen on both sides claim that their quarrel is not with the general public, but with the system and the relatively few selfish, power hungry persons who are in control of the system.

Even if one accepts the thesis that the greatest single threat to the welfare of the world, including, of course the security of our own country and its people is the threat of Russian domination, the problem still remains; how does one best cope with this threat? If the Russian populace is not completely Satanic, are there some methods that we will forego in our responses to them, in order to increase the chances of reducing the drive for domination, reducing the fear that the U.S. is also implacably seeking to dominate them?

And what about the other 80% of the population of the world, the other five hundred odd sovereign nations, many of whom, especially those in the "Third World" - the struggling, underdeveloped countries - do not consider

either Russia and its people or the U.S.A and its people as the acme of evil? Few Americans - except for those with an exalted view of Americans as the sole, saving remnant, the elect, the chosen people - look upon this 80% as beyond redemption, to the values that we prize and that we claim we are trying to preserve and foster against the totalitarian forces stemming from Russia. What a great many Americans ^{however} do believe about this ^{94%} majority of the world's population is that they are too ignorant or naive to recognize that the worst of all evils is the threat of Russian domination, rather than the poverty and famine and corruption and domination by those in power in their own country - the daily enemies they confront and that for them are Satan. These people, we feel, need to be and can be won over to see it our way and become our faithful allies. ^{in battling the true world menace.} In our dealings with these countries and their people, do the same methods apply that we apply when we deal with our deadly antagonist: no holds barred, anything goes? Or do we behave differently here? These are questions that the U.S. government in seeking to formulate and carry out its foreign policies must constantly keep in mind.

Every government ~~to some extent in~~ in some measure seeks to influence the behavior of other governments and their people - seeks to get them to act in ways which are helpful to its own comfort and security, ~~and its own values~~. The motives of such actions are always to some extent selfish. When they are completely so, we say that they are base, exploiting other peoples for our own ends. The motives may also be somewhat altruistic - to help other peoples and other countries - to enlarge individual freedom, increase their comfort and sense of worth. In its foreign policy statements the U.S. throughout its history has claimed that its foreign policy goals include both these concerns. The instruments at hand to promote these goals extend from the more open forms of diplomacy, such as jawboning in the halls of international gatherings and in media pronouncements, ^{and} legislative leading to foreign aid, international cultural exchange, excise taxes, boycott etc., into the grey area of secret pressures and use of subversion and violence to the extreme of forthright military intervention. The role of the CIA in carrying out foreign policy lies in the grey area.

Since actual military intervention is such a drastic measure, fraught with such terrifying ramifications, including the sacrifice of human life, in our country it is a step that requires public airing and congressional approval. This is the essence of an open society. It is a key reason why I support our system over against the Russian system.

One of the dilemmas of CIA missions - those that involve subversion and violence and ^{that can and often do} ~~these can indeed~~ promote counter violence - is that they are planned secretly and carried out secretly. One reason for this, obviously, is that this secrecy enhances their effectiveness. When the U2 planes were first launched by the CIA in Eisenhower's administration, they were successful in that for a time they were undetected and thus able to carry out their function unhindered. Another reason for secrecy is that it helps to minimize negative consequences - especially if the mission fails. When a secret mission flops, it is convenient for a government to deny that it was indeed ^{its} ~~their~~ action, especially if the action violates principles to which the government claims it adheres. Thus, the government can escape international and even national public condemnation. When Colonel Powers in his U2 plane was shot down over Russia, the initial response of the U.S. government was to deny the purpose of the mission. After all it had violated the international agreement on respecting national air space. It was only after the Russians came forth with some hard evidence - Powers himself and the plane wreckage - that the truth was admitted.

In this very imperfect, grey world we are indeed faced with hard choices - often the necessity of choosing between two evils, of using a less-than-perfect, or less-than-worthy method to achieve a good end. Such choices are serious and should be taken only after serious exploration of the possible consequences. Is the end so worthy that it justifies the use of the means, or that it outweighs the bad consequences that may flow from employing these means. The great majority of the covert actions of the CIA have been not in Russia but in countries of the third world. In the battle for winning the allegiance of uncommitted peoples, how important is it to adhere to standards of behavior which we have professed to cherish and to work for? How important is it to be honest and faithful to our allies? In 1958 the U. S. thru the CIA secretly supported the effort to topple the government of Sukarno in Indonesia - providing ammunition, materials, and even planes and pilots. After an American pilot was shot down the U. S. withdrew, and the rebellion failed. As Powers commented in his volume, "The weak point in covert military activity is that a single mistake reveals CIA's connection and makes it necessary for the U.S. either to abandon the cause completely or convert to a policy of overt military intervention." Usually U.S. policy has been to withdraw, leaving behind friendly elements who had entrusted their lives to the American enterprise, to absorb the full wrath of their opponents.

It is almost axiomatic that the more people involved in a secret plan or program, the greater the likelihood that it will cease to remain a secret. When Eisenhower was president, he was very uncomfortable with meetings of the National Security Council, in which policies and especially plans that were delicate, dangerous, and dubiously ethical, were being formulated. He complained about the fact that there was a whole roomful of people. He, and nearly every American president since, was especially uncomfortable about bringing members of Congress in on such matters. Politicians cannot be trusted to keep a secret. So there was created a smaller, inner-circle committee of three or four whose function was to take up especially crucial, touchy matters and make decisions. Incidentally, a second role of that committee was to protect the president in case the mission decided on backfired.

When Nixon was president, the Chilean Marxist reformer, Allende, was one of his bete noir and he determined that Allende should not become president of Chile in the upcoming elections. The Committee of Forty, as the NSC Operating Board was then called, was consulted and certain actions agreed upon - to seek to discredit Allende and to promote a rival candidate, all under the aegis of the CIA - a covert operation. In spite of the CIA efforts, Allende won a plurality, and it became evident that the Congress of Chile would proceed to ratify him as President. At this juncture, David Phillips, a CIA agent, was pulled off his regular assignment by his superior and directed to ^{had} a very secret task force to prevent Allende from assuming the presidency. Phillips discovered that the Committee of Forty had considered the matter and had taken measures: it had allotted \$25,000 to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende's ratification, and ordered other measures to "put pressure on the economy". However, these measures had nothing to do with Phillips' task. On order from the top, he was to set up a very secret back-up plan to thwart the inauguration by "whatever means." This could only mean to instigate and ^{support} a military coup. Phillips was distressed. First, he was convinced that such a plot was unrealistic - had little chance of succeeding. Secondly, he learned that the decision had been made by three men - Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig - and that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the American Ambassador to Chile, let alone the Committee of Forty, had definitely not been involved in the decision and knew nothing about it. Thirdly, he had qualms that this action directly opposed the democratic process that was being carried out by the Chileans - a process which the U.S. heralds as the safeguard against a closed totalitarian society. (Incidentally, the plan moved forward but upon the assassination of a

Chilean general, Schneider, was abandoned as being impractical.)

These two illustrations demonstrate that the existence of an instrument to carry out secretly the aims and goals of the executive branch of our government, specifically the president, tends, under the cover of the necessity for secrecy, to restrict discussion and analysis of such plans - their goals, ^{their feasibility} their ramifications - and thus lends itself to the whims, or phobias, or self-serving ends of one person or a small coterie of his subordinates who are dependent on him for keeping their jobs. The safeguards of check and balance, of open discussion are sacrificed, and all must depend upon one or a very few men - their purity of purpose, their knowledge of the country and its people that the plan affects, and their judgments as to possible consequences.

Thomas Powers in his overall assessment of the CIA expressed greatest concern not about the CIA per se but the fact that its existence, especially when it became the secret arm in intervening in affairs of other nations, provides a grave temptation to the president to follow his moods and preconceptions, showing little perception of the impact of that action on the people of the country affected, and often cavalier to the risk of failure. Added to that is the temptation to use this instrument for ends less than worthy. For example, there were the efforts of Nixon to use the CIA to help stymie the Watergate investigation - motive, personal political survival. And there was the strong economic motivation to promote and defend American corporate interests - Anaconda Copper Co. in Chile and The United Fruit Company in Guatemala. In both these instances it strains credulity to defend the perversion of the democratic process and the overthrow of a democratically elected government in favor of military regimes purely on the grounds of the threat to America's national security.

I am not at all in agreement with the decision of Philip Agee, who, when he left the CIA, determined to spill the beans and name names of CIA agents all over the world in order to bring about the dismantling of this wicked ^{secret arm} CIA. But it is difficult for me not to feel a twinge of sympathy for him as he describes in his autobiography the moral compunctions he experienced in carrying out some of his orders as CIA agent in South and Central American countries. At one point he put in writing his feelings - a letter of resignation from the CIA, never submitted, his Apologia. In part it read:

I joined the Agency because I thought I would be protecting the security of my country by fighting against communism and Soviet expansion,

while at the same time helping other countries preserve their freedom. Six years in Latin America have taught me that the injustices forced by small ruling minorities on the mass of the people cannot be eased sufficiently by reform movements such as the Alliance for Progress. The ruling class will never willingly give up its special privileges and comforts. This is class warfare and is the reason why communism appeals to the masses in the first place. We call this the "free world" but the only freedom under these circumstances is the rich people's freedom to exploit the poor. ...

Agency (CIA) operations ... tend to give the ruling minorities even stronger tools to keep themselves in power and to retain their disproportionate share of the national income.

American business and government are bound up with the ruling minorities in Latin America. Our interest and their interests - stability and return on investments - are the same.

I can't answer the dilemma of Soviet expansion, their pledge to bury us, and socialism in Latin America. Uruguay however is proof enough that conventional reform does not work, and to me it is clear that the only real solutions are those advocated by the communists and others of the extreme left. The trouble is that they are on the Soviet side of the Chinese side or the Cuban side - our enemies.

I may not agree with the solution Agee proposes, but his analysis and the history of U.S. policies in Central and South America and the CIA's involvement, do point to a real question. Have our motives been primarily to help the people of these nations improve their own conditions, and to preserve or promote their freedom, or has it been largely the more narrow selfish one of protecting the security of our country and the economic welfare of some of our own people. If the latter, it is little wonder that we have difficulty in winning such countries to our side in the battle versus the Russian Goliath. The flaw in making the struggle to combat Russian domination the be-all of our foreign policy is that it leads us to the conclusion, "Any government, no matter how bad, is better than a communist one." With some justification, the people ⁱⁿ of these countries protest, "You are using us for your own narrow ends. You have no real concern for us as persons - our rights, our judgments, our freedom, no real concern to help us resolve our real problems. And they point to the secret, illegal exploits of the CIA as prime evidence for their suspicions.

The secret operations of the CIA pose another dilemma. In pursuing short term objectives by surreptitious and dubiously ethical means, might the CIA so effectively emulate police-state operations as to undermine if not destroy the fabric of free, open democratic societies, both abroad and even at home. Part of the furor and opposition ^{in the U.S.} that reached flood tide in the early 1970's against the CIA ~~in the U.S.~~ was occasioned by revelations that under the excuse of "threat to national security" the CIA carried on

such activities inside the U.S. as opening mail of American citizens, infiltrating autonomous institutions such as the National Student Association and domestic labor unions, holding prisoners in detention for long periods without due process, and carrying on drug experiments on Americans without their consent. One of the interesting consequences of the publicity occasioned by exposés of these actions was that directives went out banning further use of these tactics. The key argument was that they were unconstitutional, violating the basic rights of Americans. But what about violating the basic rights of persons who are not Americans? Is it wrong for a CIA officer ^{under orders} to bribe a U.S. Senator but right for him, under top government authorization, to bribe a Chilean Senator? The justification that comes to mind is, "Ah, but the ends sought are different." In other words, bribery in this country is always for a selfish, bad end. Bribery in another country as a means of thwarting a communist take-over is for a good end. If I might be a bit cynical (or realistic?) when people use this rationalization, the term "good end" very often means simply, "for the briber's good."

But, granted the possibility that the motives for such an act are really altruistic - the bribe is offered for the good of the individual bribed and for the people he represents and even for the good of the world at large - the problem still remains, is the sanctioning of such means to secure a good end more dangerous in its tearing at the fabric of responsible behavior than it is valuable in achieving the immediate goal? It's the old problem: does the end justify the means?

I am not a born-again pacifist. My view of human nature is rather Calvinistic. Granted man's baser instincts, his selfish propensities and his frailties of judgment, I believe that there may be times when men with base motives and shrewd calculation gain power and create conditions which can only be altered by the use of force, bad as such use may be per se. But such measures are desperate measures, fraught with such dangerous consequences that they should be taken as real last steps, soberly after considerable and prayerful examination. Violence tends to breed violence. Violence tends to debase the one who uses it. If the end justifies the ^{means} ~~end~~, the problem remains how to prevent the means from becoming the end.

Since the beginning of the CIA, especially when the "operations" function was ^{added} ~~attached~~ to the intelligence gathering and analysis function, there has been concern about these questions. How can an organization of an open

society, ^{one} that operates in secrecy, ^{one} that depends on secrecy for its effectiveness, ^{one} that is protected against the examination and review that marks all other phases of governmental operation, be kept from becoming a monster.

In the aftermath of the ~~Bay of Pigs fiasco~~, the Allende affair, Vietnam, and ~~the~~ Watergate and the revelations ^{they} followed about the secret activities of the CIA, there were strong waves of protest against "The Company." Stated in its most extreme terms, "The Agency is the instrument of the President to employ without redress any expedient of power to keep in office or to carry out his will, putting aside all norms of decency and invading the basic rights of citizens under cover of "national security" even in peace time. Let's get rid of it."

Predictably, in the mid 70's morale within the CIA sank to a low as talk of dismantling the agency was rife. This rueful story circulated in the halls of the Agency.

A federal census taker knocked on the door of the shack of a Tennessee mountaineer. Zeke, the obvious head of the household, answered, and the questioning began. "How many members are there in the family." After some silent counting, "Twenty-three." "No, I don't mean cousins and grandparents and uncles and aunts, just the immediate family." "Twenty-three." When the census taker continued to express doubt, Zeke yelled to his wife, "Round up the kids!" And she did and they all lined up and were introduced. The census taker was astounded, but he took down names and ages and then counted and said, "But there are only twenty children - where is the twenty-first?" "Who's missing?" demanded Zeke. Finally, noting the notch in height between the four-year old and the two-year old he grunted, "It must be little Luke. Where is Luke." "Oh," volunteered one of the brood, "Luke was in the privy and he fell in the hole." After answering all the remainder of the census taker's questions, Zeke invited the official to join him for a libation of home brew. "But," exclaimed the census taker, "Aren't you going to rescue little Luke?" "Well," drawled Zeke, "I dunno. It's easier to get another one than to haul him out and clean him up."

"Well," said the deputy director of the CIA, who originated this fable, "I believe that better judgment will prevail. Little Luke (the CIA) will not be abandoned, but there will be continuing efforts to clean him up."

The CIA did survive the nadir of the 1970's, and despite its current troubles it will - and I think should-survive in the 1980's. Our nation

would be most foolish if it did not maintain a coordinating agency to collect and assess information about its antagonists. A system of intelligence gathering including spying with its paraphernalia of secret agents, unhappily is needed. And for such a system to work well, secrecy is necessary. The real sticky point comes at the next step - secret actions aimed at frustrating opponents and fostering our own goals and objectives - the "dagger" aspect of the "cloak and dagger" operation. If it is to continue as a part of the CIA task, some cleaning up is needed. Many proposals have been made - and a few implemented - in recent years. Here are ones I would support:

1. Establish clearer guidelines defining and limiting the duties and actions of the CIA in the area of covert action. Define, for example, what kinds of activities are beyond the pale. David Phillips urges a ban on assassination. I agree. Or again, when covert actions become para-military, perhaps they should be turned over to the military for execution. They can hardly be kept secret anyway.
2. Establish clearer guidelines on the kinds of information about the CIA that should be open to Congress and to the general public, and the kinds of information that the President can legitimately withhold from Congress, the press, and the public.
3. Involve representatives of Congress more directly and thoroughly in the discussions leading to decisions on covert actions that the CIA is assigned.

All three of these recommendations are aimed at restricting the power of the president. At present, for example, the system of classification of information that may be released or may be withheld operates under executive order. Each president decides. As I have already indicated, under the cloak of the importance of secrecy, presidents in the past have tended to limit discussions and then decision making on CIA activities to fewer and fewer people, and if the actions themselves are kept secret and the reasons for them also, they are not open to review. Should a president be held accountable? How can he be, meaningfully, when those to whom he is accountable - Congress and ultimately the people in this "open society" - are not capable of judging because they lack information on which to base their judgment. Again, there is a dilemma. Too much public release of information can endanger national security. But also, too much presidential secrecy can pose a threat to national security. Which is the better risk? Can a system of accountability be developed that safeguards against either extreme

In a vast republic such as ours, the responsibility for complex

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decisions on matter of grave import must be delegated to some few. The safeguard against possible abuse of power is our system of checks and balances, a free press, and open discussion. Since Congress is given constitutional power to declare war, raise armies, regulate armed forces, ratify treaties, and approve official appointments, what information does it need to do these properly? If the CIA is indeed the president's secret arm for carrying out policy vis-a-vis other nations, then at least designated members of Congress should be involved in the sensitive decision on CIA actions that border on or involve arms and violence and subversion.

In the final analysis, if there needs to be such a secret instrument for national defense, and if the basic responsibility for national defense rests in the administrative branch and its commander in chief, then structural safeguards such as guidelines and Congressional involvement are not enough. The holders of this responsibility and power must be worthy of our trust.

4. My fourth and last recommendation then is to us - the people of the United States. In this world of great tensions and threat of massive destruction, we must take care to elect to the presidency persons who have a broad understanding of history and of other peoples and cultures, a deep concern for the promotion of human rights, an awareness of the great dangers that accompany the abuse of these rights from the extreme left and the extreme right, and both the predilection and the ability to listen to many points of view and to be open to new evidence prior to determining foreign policy and deciding on programs to further this policy. With this kind of person, there will not be as great a likelihood for the power inherent in a secret arm such as the CIA to be used selfishly or foolishly.

As we look forward to the second "Presidential Debate" we would do well to keep these qualities in mind.